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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
'VILLARD Y. MORRIS, Executor of 
the Estate of 'Yilliam Shields, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
TED RUSSELL and :MANILA RUS-
SELL, his 'vife, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 7 630 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
'Ve find great difficulty in conforming to the pre-
scribed rules concerning the controverting of appellants' 
Statement of Facts. Appellants' Statement is lengthy, 
covering 13 pages, and the transcript likewise is lengthy. 
Although appellants' facts as recited are correct as sup-
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ported by some parts of the record, yet they are one-
sided and pick out the evidence 1nost favorable to appel-
lants, they having omitted any reference to the testi-
mony of plaintiff's witnesses or to the testimony of their 
witnesses who appeared unfavorable to them. We pre-
sent our version of the facts as the most expedient 
method of controverting and qualifying the facts stated 
by appellants. 
Appellants correctly relate the pleadings in the case 
and the trial of the cause, including defendants' moving 
at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence for a nonsuit or 
dismissal of both causes of action, and the court's grant-
ing the motion as to the quantun1 meruit count. 
William Shields, plaintiff and respondent, went to 
work on defendants' farm in November, 1941, for board 
and room and "snmll wages." lie stayed under this ar-
rangement until the sumn1er of 1943 and made no claim 
for any part of the time he worked on the farm, since 
defendants had fulfilled that part of the en1ployment 
contract. 
In June, 1943, the defendants were leaving the farm, 
having bought a tourist court on South State Street. 
The war was then on in full blast. Jobs were plentiful 
and wages were high (52). It was plaintiff's intention 
to go out and get a new job (51), but defendants told 
plain tiff if he would go with them to the tourist court, 
they would give him big wages and he wouldn't have hard 
work to do (51-80). Before plaintiff consented to go 
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down there with them, he had an understanding that 
they would pay him "big wages" (51). The amount was 
set at $100.00 per month plus board and room ( 52-89). 
Plaintiff testified that he went down with the under-
standing that he was supposed to do light duties (53), 
but when he went down to the court, he testified he had 
"beds to make, floors to scrub and mop, then the painting 
to do, then the lights, to keep the place clean, collect 
rents" (52). He had to gather up the garbage, burn all 
he could burn of it, and dispose of the rest (53). Plain-
tiff scrubbed walls in the cabins, changed the linen on the 
beds, shoveled all the snow from the premises (53). Plain-
tiff took care of 21 units, exclusive of the two units in 
defendants' home (54). Plaintiff did the necessary 
plumbing repairs and did the emergency electrical re-
pairs. He painted cabins inside and out (54). 
There' were quite a number of trees cmning do\vn 
the north side of the premises, then across and up the 
south side. Plaintiff grubbed the trees out so they could 
be removed. These were big box elders and willow trees. 
Plaintiff then cut them up (54 & 87). He was put to work 
removing these trees to make way for the first five new 
cabins defendants were to build. Plaintiff cut the wood 
into fire wood lengths and sold it, and defendant Ted 
Russell took one-half of these proceeds from plaintiff 
(55). 
Plaintiff all alone dug 1100 feet of 9-foot deep sewer 
trench (82) for the laying of pipe, commencing from the 
South side of the cabins on State Street down to within 
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50 feet of Main Street, across the driveway, and up the 
south side of the north cabins (56-83). Plaintiff laid the 
pipe in this trench ( 82). 
Plaintiff helped tear down the first five cabins, and 
helped tear down and rebuild some more, but didn't 
remember exact!ly how many. Plaintiff put in the forms 
on which to build the new cabins (56). He was required 
to do all the inside digging (for installation of sewer, 
plumbing pipes, gas line, etc.) on all the cabins remodeled 
(56). Plaintiff installed the water pipe and gas pipe in 
the first five cabins ( 85), on which the contractor was to 
pay him for the inside digging. 
The cabins on the south side were remodeled. He 
participated in that, and the rest romn vv-hich was torn 
out and remodeled (57). On the first five south cabins 
remodeled, plaintiff testified Ted Russell helped plain-
tiff do the remodeling, rather than Shields helping Rus-
sell (58). Plaintiff assisted in the tearing down andre-
building of approximately 19 cabins (58), he estimated. 
Plaintiff got up and worked on the garbage before 
defendants aroEle, and part of the time did a lot of work 
on the cabins befor,e breakfast. Plaintiff generally got 
up about 8 :30, and sometimes quit at dark, sometimes 
worked until 7 :00 p.m. and sometimes worked until after 
midnight, depending on what he was doing. He stayed 
with the work until it was done (59). Every morning, 
defendants gave him a list of what to do and he worked 
until he finished it ( 66). l-Ie was alone in charge of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
entire tourist court in the su1n1ner time when defendants 
went fishing two or three days at the end of each week 
(59). One tin1e they went to Boston via Florida and he 
was left alone in charge from three to four weeks ( 60 
& 88), and had the rental and collections, Inanageinent, 
upkeep, and cleaning (88). Defendants hardly ever 
missed a week going fishing during the sum1ner (61) 
and left plaintiff alone on those occasions. 
During his stay with defendants, plaintiff never 
drew his money. He was fed and housed by defendants. 
He bought his tobacco and incidentals from money 
earned from ice tips (67)/and doing little odd jobs for 
neighbors when he had time. In addition, plaintiff earned 
money by selling beer bottles and pop bottles that the 
tenants left, but quit when defendant Russell insisted 
that Shields give Russell the money from the sale of these 
bottles ( 71). 
Defendants once permitted plaintiff to work unload-
ing rockwool and he earned $50.00 (63). Plaintiff de-
cided to quit defendants once when Russell discovered 
plaintiff had this $50.00, and got mad and accused his 
wife of having given plaintiff the money. Plaintiff went 
up town and rented a room. When he went down to 
breakfast the following morning, Mrs. Russell was wait-
ing outside and told him to come back, saying, "If you 
don't go back, you won't get your wages" (64-66-108). 
Plaintiff returned and worked continuously thereafter 
until! he became ill in August, 1949. 
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Plaintiff testified he had no need for his $100.00 a 
month during the years he was employed (67) and never 
made demand upon the defendants, for the reason that 
he knew they needed the money to pay for their auto 
court which they were buying on time, and plaintiff 
thought they would pay him. He didn't need the money. 
He was getting old and thought the money would be 
available to him when he did need to have some money 
(67). There was never any arrangement as to when 
his wages were to be paid. Likewise, there was no evi-
dence that he was hired to work for any specified period 
of time. 
Plaintiff was going to quit once to get better wages. 
I-Ie was going to work for contractors building nev-\" 
homes on 21st East, but was required to pay $20.00 for 
union dues (69), so the Union IIall offered him a job on 
the Salt Flats. But defendants talked hi1n out of taking 
it because the work would be too hard (70 and 96). He 
was going to quit to take a job herding sheep for $125.00 
per month, room and board, but the defendants told him 
he would have to pay for all sheep losf. Plaintiff believed 
them, and so declined the employment (70 & 71). 
In August, 1949, plaintiff became sick one night 
and threw up about two quarts of blood in an old sink 
and on the floor. He was taken to the hospital for seven 
days and fed intravenously. The doctor told him he could 
go home if Mrs. Russell would fi."'\: what the doctor 
ordered him to eat (72). Plaintiff returned home while 
defendants were absent, and their son gave him a cabin. 
The next morning defendants told him to get out (7:)). 
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Plaintiff worked seven days a week except when he 
sometime~ took a few days off in the fall to go hunting 
with Russell ( 108). He wore com1non clothes, working 
clothes which were supplied to him by defendants (108). 
He never had a sick day to keep him from working, until 
he went to the hospital (109). Sometimes plaintiff got 
three meals a day, sometimes he got a sandwich, and 
sometimes he got only two meals w}len Mrs. Russell was 
busy with her beauty work. Plaintiff bought his own 
tobacco from ice tips. Mrs. Russell once gave him $15.00 
and $10.00 another time to buy clothes (93). That was all 
the money he ever received from defendants., He kept 
a record in a book of everything paid him or received 
from defendants, but the book disappeared (99-103). 
Defendants' counsel showed plaintiff defendants' 
proposed "Exhibit 1" dated March 19, 1948, according 
to Ted Russell, (188), and listing first the statement, 
"Received $82.50 for carpenter work," and signed by R. 
L. Shrewsbury, listing second, "Received $82.50 for car-
penter work," and supposedly signed by William Shields, 
and listing third, "Received $5.00," signed by Williarn 
Shields. Plaintiff admitted that the bottom signature 
was his, but denied that the signature above it covering 
the receipt of $82.50 for carpenter work, was his. 
:Mr. Louis Gabardi testified for plaintiff and said 
that his home is south of the Russell property. He had 
lived there for the last fourteen years, and from his 
home he could see the front of Russell's house and part 
of their yard, including the two east cabins, and had seen 
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plaintiff there from 1943 to 1949. Gabardi testified that 
whenever he saw plaintiff, Shields was always busy 
working (111), and was often working after sundown. 
He saw Shields on the job as early as he, the witness, 
got up in the morning. From witness's limited view of 
the Russell yard, he had seen plaintiff shoveling snow, 
raking leaves, cleaning up, working on a sewer, and 
hauling garbage (112). 
Mrs. Joseph Kaufman was called by plaintiff and 
testified that from 1943 to 1946 or 1947, she had resided 
in an apartment in Mr. Gabardi's home. Her view of 
Russell's premises was limited to the front of the Russell 
home and yard. She saw Shields in and out of the Russell 
pre1nises from 1943-1946, and from her limited view, she 
saw Shields in and out front working around the front 
yard, and at the time; she saw him, he was busy. She 
testified she attended :Mrs. Russell's beauty parlor and 
that l\1rs. Russell used to do the hair all around there 
(116). 
Plaintiff called George A. Zee who operated a 18-
unit motel in Salt Lake City, Utah, operating it from 19-±2 
until the present. He·testified that he 1naintained a mini-
mum of two employees during the winter and a minimum 
of three employees during the summer to help hun main-
tain his tourist court. His minimun1 prevailing ·wage 
rate from 1943 to 1949 was from $.50 to $.85 an hour 
(118). He testified that his pay rate for a general handy-
man or custodian from 1943 to 1949 was $120.00 per 
month for a 48-hour week, plus a room of the value of 
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$30.00 per month. On occasion~, he had a person ein-
ployed as a si1nple handyman only, doing none of the 
duties of changing linens or renting cabins, who re-
ceived $125.00 per nwnth for a 6 day week, but his hours 
varied so that son1e days he worked only 4 hours a day 
and son1eti1nes he might work 8 hours a day ( 123). 
Plaintiff then rested his case and the heretofore 
described n1otion of defendants for nonsuit or dismissal 
was made, and granted as to the quantum meruit. Plain-
tiff's counsel presented authorities to the court in cham-
bers challenging the granting of the nonsuit, which the 
court took under advisement, and the defendants pro-
ceeded with their case. 
George Ungricht, son of 11anila Russell, was called , 
by defendants and testified that from 1943 to 1944 when 
he left for the service, Shields took care of the garbage 
and was the handJl-nan around the place and helped 
Russell with whatever was going on around the place. 
On direct examination, the following ensued. 
"Q. Did he do the sewer job he testified to earlier~ 
A. "That sewer job was done. But the septic 
tank, when the septic tank was put in and 
the sewer was laid behind the cabins, it was 
when I got a fifteen day leave out of the 
Navy. Ted, Bill, and I, all worked on that 
sewer, and we put that in during the time I 
was on furlough from the Navy" (132). 
The witness then testified in rebuttal to plaintiff's 
statements, that he had never observed plaintiff left in 
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charge of the tourist cabins-that Mr. and Mrs. Carlaw 
were left in ·charge from 1946 to 1949 when the witness 
returned to the court. He said Mr. Emmett Fletcher 
was left in charge when the Russells went to Boston 
(134); that plaintiff did not put in over 7 hours a day 
working and it did not involve heavy work. The witness 
testified that the terms of employment involved board 
and room, clothing, and a little spending money because 
Shields had told him that in 1941 ( 135). Following 1943, 
Mr. Shields had never again made that statement to him 
· (135), but he knew that if contrary arrangements had 
been made, he would have been informed of them (135). 
He didn't know how much money his 1nother gave 
Shields, but he knew that she was always giving him 
money (136). He estimated that plaintiff smoked a can 
of tobacco every two days. IIis n10ther, not Shields, 
cleaned the cabins and changed the linen (137). 
In addition, he testified his mother took care of the 
five rooms the family occupied, did her beauty work; 
and cooked three meals a day for them (138). Later the 
witness testified that he had helped Shields dig the sewer 
line Shields claimed he had dug alone (139), then later 
said he and Shields and Russell had dug it (140). Plain-
tiff watered the lawn, and shoveled snow to clear paths 
to the cabins (142), and Shields helped Russell tear down 
one cabin that the witness knew of (143). He testified 
that Shields helped Russell with the plrunbing and gas 
repairs, and tha_t between Mr. Russell and Mr. Shields 
. all the work of the 24-cabin motor court was done that 
required doing about the premises. They did all the vvork 
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on the ~-1 units and the pre1nises, except change the 
linens and keep the cabins clean ( 1-1--1-). 
Ted Rn8sell was called as a witness in his own behalf 
and testified that he took the plaintiff to the tourist 
cabins as a yard man for clearing snow, removing gar-
bage, picking up papers and anything general, in ex-
change for board and room only (150). Russell was 
extensively exan1ined by his counsel concerning the work 
for which plaintiff sued in quantum meruit, (153 to 
183), 29 pages of testimony on direct examination alone. 
Very little of his testimony concerned a denial of plain-
tiff's alleged express contract and affirmance of the 
express contract alleged by defendants. 
vVitness was asked (153) as to whether he had 
ever left plaintiff in charge of the tourist court and 
witness replied that "Shields destruction purposes was 
so great, I seen I couldn't give him no responsibility. 
I did not give him tools to work with. He would break 
them. He broke a couple of lavatories. I had to take 
all my dies away. I paid $38.00 for two dies he ruined 
for me doing plumbing work and electric work." Rus-
sell claimed that as early as September, 1945, he learned 
that Shields could not handle implements or act with 
any degree of competency in anything higher than man-
ual labor ( 185) and so entrusted only manual labor to 
him. However, defendants "Exhibit 1" a receipt where-
by defendant tried to prove that he hired Shields to 
perform specialized carpenter work and paid him $82.50 
per week therefor (157), was dated March, 1948 (188). 
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Russell explained he hired Shields as a carpenter and 
paid him that kind of money out of sympathy (188). 
Russell impeached the testimony of his own witness 
and stepson, George Ungricht, who had testified that 
Shields dug the sewer trench. Russell denied that Shields 
had dug any part of the trench; that plaintiff had done 
nothing but move a few rocks out of the path of the 
trench ( 156 and 187). 
Russell apparently attempted to prove that plajn-
tiff's later illness was induced by too much smoking 
(171), and contrary to Ungricht's testimony that plain-
tiff smoked a can of tobacco every two days, Russell 
testified that Shields sn1oked two cans of tobacco every 
day (171). Then to illustrate his generosity toward 
plaintiff, Russell testified that when he was back East, 
he went to the tobacco dryers in Richmond, Virginia, 
and brought back 25 or 26 pounds of dry tobacco leaf 
as a gift to Shields and testified this tobacco lasted 
plaintiff one week, a result \Vhich would have plaintiff 
smoking the equivalent of about 16 cans of tobacco 
per day ( 171). When this anomalous result was pointed 
out to Russell on cross-examination, he changed his 
story and said he had brought back only 8 or 10 pounds, 
and that it had taken plaintiff two weeks to smoke it 
(197). 
Russell claimed he went fishing on Friday nights 
and would come back Saturday night or Sunday morn-
ing and on those occasions did not leave plaintiff in 
charge (160). J\irs. Carlaw was left in charge and 
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Emmett Fletcher took charge when there was ~mne 
work to be done in the cabins (160). Russell admitted 
that he and Shields did all the maintenance work on 
the pren1ises, but that Shields' only part therein was 
to fetch and carry the tools for Russell (186). 
Despite Russell's clain1 that plaintiff was to work 
for board and room and nothing more, he testified on 
direct exmnination that he gave plaintiff an average of 
$1-!3.00 to $1G3.00 a Inonth, including board and room, 
clothing, tobacco, and everything (166), and yet, when 
asked whether he Inade any individual payments of cash 
to the plaintiff over and above tobacco, clothing, etc., 
Russell could only state that during the entire nine 
years, he gave the plaintiff $10.00 when ~ir. Shields 
was in the hospital (151).' 
Of the $1-15.00 to $165.00 per Inonth that Russell 
claimed he gave Shields, Russell said about one-half of 
that would be board and romn (191), but admitted that 
he reported the value of the board and room to the 
Social Security Board as being worth only $50.00 per 
month (192). Plaintiff claimed that the other one-half, 
or $72.50 or $82.50 a month, covered tobacco, clothing, 
and cash given to plaintiff, but he would have to go 
home to get his receipts and figure out just how to 
account for the disbursement of that monthly amount 
(194). 
Russell admitted that 10 wooden cabins (198) were 
torn down and complete new cinder block cabins were 
built (198), and on the remaining 14 cabins he installed 
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new showers, tile floors, tile baths, new sinks, new elec-
tric fixtures, and new plastering therein ( 198-199). He 
had screens made and installed in his home, replastered 
his home, had new cement front steps put in, sawed 
the trees in front of his house and throughout the 
premises, and that all of this work was done by outsiders 
-none of it by Shields (200). On direct examination, 
Mr. Russell produced a number of receipts (Defendants' 
"Exhibit 2") to various contractors, supply houses, and 
workmen, to indicate that outsiders had necessarily done 
all of the work completed on the premises. We submit 
that' the total of all such receipts, $2,649.71, could never 
approximate the figure Mr. Russell would have had to 
pay for all of the foregoing construction, remodeling, 
addition, fixtures, and repair if it had all been done by 
outsiders. 
William Carlaw was called by defendants and testi-
fied that George Ungricht was left in charge of the 
cabins on the occasions when the Russells were away 
( 206). When asked the leading question if 1frs. Car law 
was left in charge at any time, he said he guessed l\irs. 
Carlaw had been left in charge about six or seven times. 
When asked what type of work he had observed Mr. 
Shields doing the eight years Carlaw observed him at 
the court, he testified he saw Shields picking up the 
garbage and sweeping around; that he helped Mr. Rus-
sell do the plumbing work around the court (209), 
helped dig the sewer and helped put in the line (210). 
Carlaw testified that he didn't know whether Shields had 
ever been placed in charge of the court (209). Carlaw 
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stated that the Russells were gone sometimes two or 
three days and s01neti1nes a week at a time, but admitted 
he had no idea as to how 1nany thnes they had gone 
(213). 
:J[rs. \Villimn Carlaw was called by defendants and 
stated that she was left in charge of the cabins during 
the Russell's absence during the last three years. Dur-
ing those times, :Jir. Shields took care of the yard and 
was working around taking care of the court, but she 
admitted that she didn't know what plaintiff did do 
when he went in the cabins (216). She denied that either 
:Jlrs. Harper, 1\Irs. Young, or Emmett Fletcher tended 
the cabins in the Russells' absence since she took over 
in 1946-1947 and 1948 (218). 
Emmett Fletcher was called by defendants and 
testified that since 1945, he spent two weeks with defend-
ants about twice a year, that he never took care of the 
place in the Russells' absence, except to help Mrs. Carlaw 
when the Russells were in Boston ( 222). 
1\Irs. ~1anila Russell was called and sworn and was 
asked by her counsel concerning exactly what work Mr. 
Shields did after he reached the auto court. She stated 
he gathered up around the yard at all times and did little 
duties around the place under Mr. Russell's direction. 
She repudiated Mr. Shield's contract claim and asserted 
that he was to work for room and board. Outside of 
change from groceries that she let plaintiff keep, she 
gave him only $10.00 once and only $15.00 once (227). 
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She admitted that Shields did a thriving ice busi-
ness (228). She admitted that Shields wore working 
clothes and was out there at all times with Russell work-
ing ( 230), and that Shields packed the laundry from 
the cabins up to the house ( 232). She testified that 
Shields never quit his employment with defendants as 
far as she knew ( 234). Shields was around the court 7 
days a week, but witness said he did not have to work. 
He could do as he pileased ( 237). 
Fred Weedon was called by plaintiff as a rebuttal 
witness. He was a contractor and built five cabins for 
defendants over a year's time, from January 28, 1946, 
to March, 1947. IIe was on defendants' premises approx-
imately four months, spread over that period of time. 
I-Ie testified that Shields did a limited amount of work 
on his payroll and was a fine worker (242). Weedon 
testified that plaintiff was busy all of the ti1ne that he 
and his men were down there. Shields cleaned up 
around, cleaned out the main lavatory every nwrning, 
helped do a lot of the plumbing around there, helped 
put in the water pipes in the cabins, worked a good deal 
with the different crews Russell hired. IIe noticed that 
Russell helped plaster one of the cabins (243). Shields 
helped lay the floor in one of the cabins and worked 
in the cabin where the wooden floor was torn out ( 244) .. 
Witness had seen Shields take tourists to their 
cabins and take care of the tourist court when the Rus-
sells were gone. 1\tfr. Russell went fishing quite often 
during the summer ( 245) and stayed two or three days 
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at a time. During the period that the Russells were in 
Boston, vVeedon saw nobody else but Shields take care 
of the tourist court. He showed the people to their 
cabins and prepared their cottages and did all of the 
rest of the work around the court (245). 
He saw Shields dig trenches for the water in each 
of the five cabins vV eedon constructed. These trenches 
were 18 inches deep and 'V eedon said that Mr. Shields 
and Mr. Russell did all of the plumbing for those five 
cottages. This did not consist of Mr. Shields simply 
carrying the tools around ( 246). Weedon was on de-
fendants' premises from 8 to 4 :30 p.m., and never saw 
plaintiff laying around-always doing something-al-
ways busy ( 247). \V eedon was to dig- the trench for 
gas and water lines up to 3 feet from the foundation 
of the cabins. Plaintiff dug the 15 feet from that water 
line, under the foundation and over to the far side of 
each cabin where the sinks were, about 18 feet per cabin 
(207), 18 inches deep (246). Russell and Shields laid 
the gas and water lines and did the plumbing to connect 
the water line which involved threading pipe, screwing, 
it together, etc. (246 and 250). The work plaintiff was 
hired by Weedon to do for him consisted of digging the 
sewer ditching behind each of the five cabins (247). :Mr. 
Weedon testified that during the times he was on the 
premises, he observed that Russell was not around there 
one-tenth a part of the time that Mr. Shields was (252). 
POINT I. 
IT WAS PROPER TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE 
JURY ON THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT, SINCE 
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THE PLEADINGS SET FORTH SEPARATE COUNTS OF 
EXPRESS CONTRACT AND QUANTUM 1>/IERUIT, AND THE 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED WAS CONFLICTING AND COULD 
SUPPORT EITHER COUNT, AND IT WAS FOR THE JURY 
TO DETERMINE WHICH COUNT WAS PROVEN. 
The amended complaint in the first cause of action 
alleges an express agreement that plaintiff was to work 
at defendants' 22-cabin tourist court n1aking beds, 
sweeping and mopping floors, painting cabins, tearing 
down old cabins, building forms for new cabins, per-
forming all plumbing and gas repairs, shoveling snow, 
watering lawns, removing garbage, and all other gen-
eral handiwork about the premises for the sum of $100.00 
per month and romn and board (1). Defendants in their 
amended answer denied such express contract and set 
forth an express agreement whereby they employed 
plaintiff as watchman and occasional handy man only 
around the tourist court for room and board only with-
out cash payment or settlement of any kind or nature 
beyond said room and board (3). Plaintiff's amended 
complaint set forth a second cause of action, that plain-
tiff performed services for defendants at their special 
instance and request between June, 1943, and August, 
1949, of the reasonable value of $150.00 per month (1), 
and admitted the receipt of board and room during said 
period as part payment (2). 
There is no question but that plaintiff was entitled 
to plead different counts in order to meet the exigencies 
of the case as presented by the evidence. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule S(E) 2 specifically permits the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
pleading of 1nultiple and inconsistent clain1s. Said rule 
provides: 
"* * * A party n1ay also state as many sep-
arate clain1s or defenses as he has regardless of 
inconsistency or whether based on legal or equi-
table grounds or on both." 
The plaintiff was entitled to instructions on both 
counts, express contract and quantum meruit, it being 
for the jury to decide what plaintiff had proved under 
all the evidence. It appeared from the evidence that 
plaintiff nright have proved all of the work he was sup-
posed to perform for $100.00 per month. Yet, the jury 
may have determined that he did not fulfill all of the 
obligations required to be performed for $100.00 per 
month. Defendants claimed an express contract that 
plaintiff was to be the watchman and occasional handy 
man only in exchange for room and board alone. How-
ever, by defendants' own testimony and the testimony 
of all of the witnesses introduced in their behalf, it was 
obvious that plaintiff had performed work of a nature 
and extent far greater than what he was to perfonn 
for room and board alone. Obviously he was entitled 
to compensation for the excess. It was for the jury to 
determine which of the two express contracts, if either, 
was substantiated by the evidence. If they found against 
both claimed express contracts, then they could properly 
find and award the reasonable value of the services they 
determined plaintiff performed. Thus Instructions 4, 5, 
and 8, excepted to by defendants and concerning the 
implied contract of employment, were proper. As 'a 
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matter of fact under the evidence as it stood at the 
' time the jury was instructed, under Rule 54 (c) ( 1), the 
court had a duty to instruct the jury as to whether 
plaintiff rendered any services to defendants under an 
implied contract and, if he did, that defendants should 
pay the reasonable value of such work and labor ren-
dered by plaintiff. Rule 54(c) (1) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides: 
"Every final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for 
or against one or more of several claimants; and 
it may, when the justice of the court requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on 
each side as between or among themselves." 
In view of the foregoing rule now prevailing m 
our jurisdiction, we feel that the l\fichigan cases and 
some few other cases cited in appellants' brief holding 
that where an express contract is sued on, recovery on 
the theory of quantum meruit is not obtainable or not 
applicable, are superseded. We feel that the Utah 
Supreme Court gave efficacy to the present rule cited 
when it decided the case of Young v. Hanson (Utah, }.1ay, 
1950), 218 Pac. 2d 666, cited in appellants' brief, where 
the court permitted a recovery on the theory of quantum 
meruit, even though there had been no pleading of 
quantum meruit. The new Rules of Civil Procedure 
attempt to do full and complete justice between the 
parties in one suit, as adduced by the evidence, whether 
such relief is sought by the pleadings or not. 
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Further, in spite of appellants' limited support of 
the Yiew that where an express contract is sued on, 
recoyery on the theory of quanhun meruit is not obtain-
able, BancToft on Code Pleading, Vol. 1, Sec. 106 to 110, 
announces the "well-settled rule that causes of action 
arising frmn contracts, express or implied, may be 
united. For exan1ple, a claim upon an express contract 
and a claim upon quanhun 1neruit may be united." 
BancToft in Sec. 108 says: 
"It is now clearly settled by the weight of 
authority that a count upon a quantum meruit 
may be joined with one upon a special contract, 
although each states only a separate ground for 
substantially the same recovery. This may often 
be necessary and is allowed for the purpose of 
meeting the exigencies of the proof. There is, 
under the code practice, no legal incompatibility 
in declaring separately upon the two causes of 
action. They need not correspond or be con-
sistent with each other. As illustrative of the 
rule just stated, it is proper to bring a count for 
the reasonable value of services with a count 
based upon an express contract to pay a stated 
commission or salary," 
citing nun1erous cases from Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Washington, VVisconsin, 
Missouri, Ohio, and New York in support of this prin-
ciple. 
BancToft's Code Pleading, Vol. 1, Section 705, speaks 
on the variance between a quantum meruit count and 
proof of express contract, where only one cause of action 
has been pleaded. 
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"Under certain authorities, it is the rule that 
a party declaring upon an express contract can-
not recover on an implied contract or on a quan-
tum meruit. In other states, however, it is the 
settled law that where the complaint alleges a 
special contract only and the proof fails to estab-
lish it, but does in fact show the rendition of 
services, a recovery may be had upon quantum 
meruit," 
citing many cases from Montana, Nevada, New York, 
Washington, and Wyoming in support. Our new code 
provision, 54( c) (1), would permit such a recovery. 
Appellants at p. 17 of their brief state that the 
plaintiff had performed his contract Jn full and there 
remained only for him to recover the money constituting 
performance on the part of the appellants. Appellants 
claim this is not a proper action on quantum meruit, but 
must be an action on the contract which was pleaded 
and proved and admitted by the appellants, but with a 
difference of opinion as to what the rate of pay was. 
Bancroft on Code Pleading, Section 706, continues: 
"It is, however, a general rule that where a 
contract has been fully performed by the plain-
tiff and nothing re1nains to be done but the pay-
ment of the money by the defendant, the liability 
of the defendant may be enforced under a count 
for the reasonable value of the services; in such 
case, the contract may be used as evidence, the 
effect of such proof being to make the stipulated 
compensation the quantum meruit in the case," 
citing n,umerous cases in support of this principle from 
California, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon. 
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POINT II. 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED WHEN 
THE COURT VACATED ITS JUDGMENT OF INVOLUN-
TARY DISMISSAL MADE FOLLOWING THE CLOSE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE, SINCE APPELLANTS HAD BEEN 
APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE STRICKEN 
COUNT MIGHT BE REINSTATED AND PROJECTED THEIR 
DEFENSE BASED ON THAT CONTINGENCY, AND THEM-
SELVES ADDUCED EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS THAT THE 
STRICKEN QUANTUM MERUIT COUNT WAS OPERATIVE. 
As related by appellants, at the close of the plain-
tiff's evidence, appellants moved for a nonsuit or dismis- ~, 
sal of the plaintiff's case for the reason that plaintiff had 
not sustained the proof of the elements that go to make 
up the cause of action stated in the amended complaint, 
particularly as to the first count covering the express 
contract. The court granted a nonsuit as to the quantum 
meruit. 
Plaintiff and his witnesses had testified to the kind 
and extent of services plaintiff had performed. Plaintiff 
called 1\:fr. George A. Zee as a witness. Mr. Zee operated 
an 18-unit motel in Salt Lake City during the years 
plaintiff had worked for defendants at their motel in Salt 
Lake City. Mr. Zee (117 to 124) testified as to the wages 
he paid his employees doing work of a comparable nature 
as plaintiff during the period of time sued on by plain-
tiff. On re-cross-examination (124), Mr. Zee acknowl-
edged that his testimony concerning wages and labor 
was confined to the experience in his own court and ad-
mitted that he was not acquainted with the same situation 
generally throughout the tourist courts in the city. 
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Following Mr. Zee's testi1nony, plaintiff rested and 
defendants made the motion for nonsuit or dismissal. 
The court felt that Mr. Zee was called as an expert wit-
ness and. had failed to prove the prevailing wage for 
services similar to plaintiff's in Salt Lake City during 
the pertinent period of time, and therefore, apparently 
felt that plaintiff had failed in a necessary element of 
proof of the reasonable value of the services under the 
quantum meruit cause of action. The Court granted 
the motion as to the quantum meruit count, although 
the court (125) had previously overruled defendants' 
motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Zee on the grounds 
that it was not probative, the court stating that the mo-
tion was not timely 1nade. The court said if plaintiff 
had a qualified witness and wanted to reopen for that 
purpose, it would allow plaintiff so to do, but then re-
fused plaintiff ti1ne in which to produce such witness 
(127). The court then informed defendants' counsel he 
could limit his proof to n1atters under the express con-
tracts, and court recessed for the day. The following 
morning in chambers and in the presence of defendants' 
counsel, plaintiff contested the court's granting of the 
nonsuit and produced authorities: 
20 Am. J ur., Sec. 386, Page 349: "In an ac-
tion to recover the value of services rendered 
under an implied contract, evidence of what 
others received for like services 1nay be properly 
considered and, in the last analysis, is the proper 
criterion." 
58 Am. Jur., Sec. 63, Page 560: "The jury 
may from ·their knowledge of business and the 
value of the labor, in assumpsit for work and 
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labor, find a verdict for the value of the work 
done upon request without an express contract, 
notwithstanding there is no evidence of the worth 
of labor at the tiine and place the work was per-
formed." 
The court thereupon infor1ned counsel for plaintiff 
and defendant that he would take the authorities and 
the matter under advisement and permitted the trial to 
proceed. 
Defendant proceeded with his evidence and in effect 
completely disregarded the court's original advice that 
he could limit his defense to matters under the express 
contract. Appellants complain that they were prejudiced 
when the court at the conclusion of defendants' case 
reinstated the quantum meruit count, claiming they had 
no opportunity to try their case and meet the proof re-
quired if the quantum meruit count had been in effect. 
Their complaint of prejudice is not consistent with the 
facts. Defendants proceeded to introduce witness after 
witness and each witness was examined under direct 
examination concerning the character and nature and 
extent of the work plaintiff performed, to establish 
that work plaintiff actually perform8d and to rebut the 
evidence of the work plaintiff claimed he did. Plaintiff 
made no objection whatsoever to the ~ntroduction of this 
whole line of testimony which served to rebut plaintiff's 
evidence. Defendants tried their case as if the quantum 
meruit had never been stricken. Their defense was in 
no way limited to whether or not express contract was 
the only issue, and the record so shows. 
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As the best and most convincing proof of that fact, 
the record clearly shows (255) that defendants had 
throughout their defense conducted their case as if the 
quantum meruit had never been expunged, for at the 
conclusion of defendants' case, the following took place 
(255): Defendants moved the court to direct a verdict 
in favor of the defendants upon the issttes raised in the 
pleadings, for the following reasons: 
"FIRST: (Defendants, contending the Statute of 
Limitations had run, requested a directed verdict as to 
all matters prior to February 23, 1946.)" 
"SECONDLY: That the plaintiff has a failure of 
their proof in this particular case, particularly as to the 
quantum_ meruit question on work and labor performed 
at the specific instance and request of the defendants." 
So, beyond a doubt, defendants cannot claim preju-
dicial error where it is obvious they projected a full and 
complete defense to both causes of action, and did so 
consciously, believing that the court was apt to reinstate 
the quantum meruit. 
Following defendants' 1notion for directed verdict, 
which the Court took under advisement (225), plaintiff 
moved that the second cause of action theretofore 
stricken be reinstated, and the court granted this motion. 
If appellants would claim error, it appears that it then 
became incumbent upon them to ask the court to permit 
them to reopen to introduce evidence in defense of that 
cause of action, if they felt they were prejudiced in anv 
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way. Defendants and their witnesses were still present. 
But defendants, knowing full well that such a request 
was sterile and that they could produce only redundant 
and repetitious evidence, having already fully covered 
their defense to the quanhun meruit count, when the 
court asked, .. Anything further'?", ~Ir. Burnham an-
swered, "That is all." (255) 
In addition, the court had a duty to reverse its 
ruling on the nonsuit of the quantum meruit, for, under 
Rule 61 of the lTtah Code of Civil Procedure: 
"No error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court ... 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice." 
We submit that for the court to have refused to 
reverse itself would have been inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice, under both the law, under which the 
court should never have granted a nonsuit in the first 
instance, and under the evidence, where the defendants 
themselves undertook a defense to the quantum meruit 
count by rebuttal and positive exposition of what plain-
tiff actually performed, and themselves made out a case 
supporting quantum meruit recovery by plaintiff. 
We will not here undertake a duplication of the evi-
dence which we have heretofore summarized in our state-
ment of facts, other than by recapitulation. Defendants' 
witnesses, George Ungricht, Ted Russell, William Car-
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law, Mrs. Carlaw, and l\{rs. Manila Russell, on direct 
examination were all examined at length concerning the 
type and extent of the service performed by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff made no objection to the introduction of this 
testimony, although it was all in rebuttal of plain-
tiff's evidence. 
We submit that under the evidence defendants intro-
duced, defendants made out a case of quantum meruit 
for plaintiff and it was mandatory on the court, under 
Rule 54 (c) ( 1), to give the jury an ir.struction on quan-
tum meruit, whether the court ever reinstated the 
stricken quantum meruit cause of action or not. On 
U ngricht's testimony alone, 1Where he testified that 
• Shields and Russell together did all of the work required 
of 24 cabins and the premises, exclusive of cleaning the 
cabins and the changing of linens, the court had a duty 
to instruct the jury on quantum 1neruit recovery, the new 
code provision permitting a party to all the recovery 
to which he is entitled from the evidence, whether 
pleaded or not. 
In Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 39 Ut. 580 and Tintic 
Standard Mining Co. v. Utah Cotmty, 80 rt. 491, cited by 
appellants, the question here involved was not raised. 
There, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case in each in-
stance, nonsuits were granted, and nothing further was 
done. Obviously, the court in these instances had nothing 
further to do than enter judgments of dismissal. 
I 
In all events, the error claimed by defendants has 
not been prejudicial, the record showing that defendants 
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offered all their proof on the issue of quantum meruit 
and conducted their defense and n1ade their motion for 
directed verdict on the theory that the quantum meruit 
cause of action was never stricken. 
POINT III 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR 
TO FEBRUARY 23, 1946, THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMIT-
ATIONS FOR WORK AND LABOR PERFORMED, FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD 
NOT COMMENCED TO RUN, PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT 
HAVING BEEN A CONTINUOUS ONE. 
Appelants cited a Utah case in anticipation of an 
argument by respondent that the matter sued on is an 
open account, Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 Pac. 
2d 180, wherein the Utah court construed Section 104-2-
23, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, by quoting frmn a 
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Spencer v. 
Sowers, 118 Kan. 259, 234 Pac. 972, at Page 973, 39 ALR 
365, concern,ing the definition of an open account. The 
Utah case concerned a claim for services by an attorney 
against a corporation and rendered over a 10 year period. 
After the court set forth the Spencer v. Sowers definition 
of open account, quoted in appellants' brief at P. 22, our 
court denied the claim, stating as follows: "The account 
drifted on for ten years without payment or credit. The 
evidence tends rather to show that each item if not con-
stituting a separate employment, was susceptible of that 
interpretation." (Claimant had admitted he was not 
employed on a general retainer basi.s). The court stated 
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that a series of charges for ttnrelated items, except that 
they were related to the same party against the other 
with no credits or counter-charges, did not constitute 
an open account contemplated by the statute. 
In support of the Bishop v. Parker case, appellants 
cite Spencer v. Sowers, supra, where three separate, in-
dependent, and wholly unrelated loans of money were 
made at separate intervals of time and no payments on 
account were made, nor was any acknowledgement there-
of in writing made by the borrower. This was held not 
to be an open account, and we agree with the court's 
holding under such facts, but those are not the facts of 
the case at bar. 
It is our contention as supported by the evidence 
( 99 & 108 concerning book account kept by plaintiff of 
amounts received) that payment on account tolls the 
statute of limitations, even were the statute of limita-
tions otherwise applicable in the case at bar. There is 
an annotation in 36 A.L.R., particularly at Page 350, in 
point. The annotation says: 
"In Sn1ith v. Velie, 60 NY 106, in which the 
intestate let the plaintiff have every year various 
sums of money and different articles of goods, of 
which he kept an account against her which was to 
apply upon her wages, the court says : ''Vhenever 
he did this, her services being continuous and no 
time fixed by agreen1ent for the payrnent of any 
part, the presumption is that it was to "apply up-
on the balance he at that tiine owed her, and not 
upon the wages of any particular year * * · * The 
payment by the intestate upon the balance due the 
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clailnant took the entire balance out of the opera-
tion of the statute.' In Pursell v. Fry, 19 Hun 
(NY) 595, 58 How. Pr. 317, an action against an 
estate on an account for services, the court says 
* * * that paYJ.nent by the intestate upon the bal-
ance due took the entire balance out of the opera-
tion of the statute. 
To sum up, the paYJ.nent operates not because 
it is an item of an account, but by virtue of an 
independent principle that a payment tolls the 
statute of lilnitations. This principle operates 
whether the payment is on an account, or on a 
note or other debt." 
In the case at bar, the defendants allege their ex-
press contract to be for board and room and no cash 
payment nor settlement of any kind or nature. Plain-
tiff's pleadings and evidence admitted, and defendants 
themselves testified, that cash and clothing were paid to 
plaintiff, which we submit were payments on account 
which tolled the statute of limitations, if such were ap-
plicable. However, we cannot overlook the implication 
of the Utah case, Bishop v. Parker, supra, as well as the 
positive holding of the Gulbrandson v. Thompson case 
hereinafter cited, that the statute of limitations in this 
case cannot and would not be applicable. 
It is possibly superfluous even to consider appel-
lants' third point relied on concerning the statute of 
limitations for the reason that the court cannot speculate 
as to which theory or theories the jury employed to per-
mit recovery. There are unlimited possibilities as to 
how the jury determined its verdict, and if quantum 
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meruit was their basis, the statute of limitations could 
be inapplicable, for who knows how n1uch and for which 
period of time the jury gave verdict. 
Ted Russell alleged plaintiff quit and came back in 
1946 (161). The verdict could have represented the 
reasonable value of the services plaintiff performed 
after 1946. It may have represented recovery under 
plaintiff's express contract for a period of time less than 
the whole, if the jury felt he may have quit. The jury 
may well have founded part of their verdict on plaintiff's 
express contract and felt that a different contract of 
hiring arose following the quitting and rehiring. They 
1nay have turned plaintiff down entirely on his claimed 
express contract if they felt he had not performed all of 
the services required for $100.00 per -n1onth plus room 
and board, and then have awarded hin1 the reasonable 
value for the services he did perform. They may have 
disbelieved plaintiff's express contract and believed de-
fendants' express contract, but yet have found that plain-
tiff performed services in excess of the limited duties 
defendants' express contract of hiring called for, and 
given plaintiff a verdict for the reasonable value of the 
services performed over and above defendants' claimed 
express contract. 
The possibilities upon which the jury predicated its 
verdict are innumerable, and it is not for the court to 
speculate as to what was in the jury's mind. In the ab-
sence of any special interrogatories which would have 
shed some illumination, the judgment must be upheld 
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if there is a legal foundation for upholding any theory 
under which the jury nwy have arrived at its verdict. 
Appellants claim to have analyzed a nu1nber of 
cases in which suit was brought for a claim rendered 
against an estate for personal services rendered over a 
long period of time and in which an application of a 
statute of limitations was made, citing first the case of 
McFeeters r. Cecil, 177 Okla. 454, 60 Pac. 2d 801, al-
legedly in support of their position. The case as they re-
cite was an action for services rendered for 13 years at 
$100 per year and for an additional 8 years at $250 per 
year. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff's 
right was limited to recovery within 3 years (Okla. stat-
ute of limitations) next preceding commencement of suit. 
However, the facts in the McFeeters case do not coincide 
·with ours in any respect. The case states: 
"The trial court held that the evidence does 
not show a single hiring for the continuous per-
formance of the work and services during the 
period of years involved. The record bears out 
the holding, as the evidence shows many intervals 
in which no service was rendered by the plaintiff, 
and particularly was this true as pointed out by 
the trial court when the same services or sub-
stantially the same were rendered by another. 
Also it was true in the year 1917, when plaintiff 
was away and lived for some time in eastern Okla-
homa." 
As appellants recite, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
f found that cases on the general subject fell into three 
factual categories, one of which is directly in point and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
the law thereon stated affirms our position. The court 
said: 
"In Kansas, Grisham v. Lee, 61 ICan. 533, GO 
Pac. 312, and Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, 46 Cal. App. 178, 188 Pac. 1034,. the. 
following rule is applied: 'If there is a single 
hiring and the term of service of the employee and 
also the time when his compensation shall become 
due, are not fixed by agreement or understand-
ing, and the hiring and service continue without 
interruption or payment until the death of the 
employer, the employment, in the absence of evi-
dence of a general custom or usage, may be 
deemed continuous, and the statute of limitations 
will not begin to run against a claim for com-
pensation until the services are ended.' 
"This rule has been followed in other cases 
in Kansas and California and in Gulbranson v. 
Thompson, 63 U t. 115, 222 Pac. 590, * * * and 
in other states. But in aH thm~e cases, there \vas 
but a single hiring and the services were ccm-
tinuons, or substantially so." 
Then the Supreme Court went on to state that the rule 
in Grisham v. Lee, etc., was not applicable under the 
facts of the Oklahoma case, since there was no evidence 
of a single hiring and the services were intermittent. 
Our case falls squarely within the rule announced 
in the McFeeters case, since the evidence showed that 
plaintiff's services were perforn1ed under general hiring 
without any express agreement as to the time of com-
pensation or the term of e1nployment and there was a 
single hiring and the services continued for a series of 
years without interruption or substantial payment. 
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.:\..t p. 27 of appellant's brief they state, and we sub-
mit improperly so, that the courts hold generally that 
where a contract for personal services is indefinite or 
uncertain as to the rate of compensation for the period 
to be covered by a specific amount of compensation, the 
statute of limitations is held to bar claim for con1pensa-
tion for the services after the statutory period has run, 
and cite several cases thereafter. One such case cited, 
1llcConnell L Crocker, 217 S.C. 334, 60 SE 2d 673, says: 
"The cited decisions from this court and those 
from No. Carolina and Virginia which reflect the 
rule that the statute of limitations applies to 
claims for services to a decedent which were ren-
dered without agreement that payment should be 
made at death or by will, appear to be out of line 
with many other courts, possibly the majority 
(italics ours) but we do not think that we should 
in this case depart from our rule, under which 
the alleged services were rendered in this case. 
The right, if any, arose under that law and should 
be confirmed by it. Numerous cases are collected 
which illustrate the conflicting views in other 
jurisdictions in 7 ALR 2d 198." 
Another case cited therein by appellants is In re 
McCormick Estate, 8 NYS 2d 179. This case is not even 
in point for the reason that the claim in said case was 
barred because not filed within the pertinent statute of 
·limitation of the probate code. 
The rule and the proper one is set forth in 56 Am. 
Jur. p. 556: 
"Where a claim for work, labor, or services 
performed is based upon distinct contracts for the 
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items specified, it would seem that the statute of 
limitations would commence to run as to those 
items represented by each contract. But where 
the matters specified in the claim are the out-
growth of entire contract for continuous labor 
or services, the demand will be considered as an 
entire one and the statute will not attach until 
the completion of the contract. Where services 
are rendered under a contract of employment 
which does not fix the term of service or the time 
for payment, the contract is continuous and the 
statute of limitations does not commence to run 
until the employee's services are terminated," cit-
ing in footnote 15, p. 556, cases in support from 
U. S., Georgia, Iowa, Ky., Mass., Orego'n, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Nebraska, and RCL. 
The case of Re Baker, 144 Neb. 797, annotated in 
155 A.L.R. 950, states a sin1ilar rule citing: 
Phifer v. Estate of Phifer, Neb., 199 N.vV. 
511; In re Estate of Skade, Neb., 283 N.\V. 8fi1; 
Fiar1non v. Smitch, Ind., 157 N.E. 284." 
Appellants' contention concerning the statute of 
lin1itations is squarely met and blocked by the Utah case 
of Gulbrandson v. Thompson, supra, which oddly enough, 
they profess 1n support of their position. Recovery there-
in was upheld, according to appellants, because of an 
agreement that claimant would care for her ailing mother 
until death, so that, according to appellants, no action 
could have been brought until such certain specified time 
had been reached. Those facts as recited by appellants 
could not be further from the truth. The Gulbrandson 
case, in light of the facts, is absolutely in point with the 
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case at bar and holds ~qnarely again~t the appellants. 
They have perverted the facts and represent that there 
was an agree1nent for the elai1nant to care for her 1nother 
until death. There is not one iota of fact in the case to 
support such a state1nent. 
The court recites these facts: plaintiff's mother was 
afflicted with an ailment which, while intermittent, 
could and thereafter did recur from time to time. Plain-
tiff had gone to California upon attaining her majority 
and was earning a fair living there. She came home and 
commenced to care for her mother and cared for her 
whenever the ailment became acute or active, and it de-
veloped over a period of years that her services were 
fairly continuous because of the frequency of her 
mother's attacks. The court found her services to be 
continuous from 1908 until the mother's death in 1922, 
despite a 6 months' intermission from December, 1915, 
until ~Iay, 1916, which the court considered a temporary 
intermission and not a cessation. The court said: 
"Under these facts, the services could not 
have been considered otherwise than continuous 
so far as the statute of limitations is concerned 
* * * She must be allowed compensation for the 
full period of time during which she rendered 
such services." 
As pointed out, no mention whatsoever is made of any 
agreement to perform services until a specified period, 
that is, until the mother's death. 
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The Gulbrandson case is identical with the case at 
bar it has never been overruled in Utah, and it is in 
' agreement with the controlling majority view in the 
United States. It is therefore pointless to argue further 
the applicability of the statute of limitations to this case. 
As a matter of fact, the Gulbrandson case is cited in 37 
Corpus Juris sec. 175, footnote 41 at p. 824, together with 
Grisham v. Lee, supra, Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust 
Bank, supra, and other cases from Indiana, Iowa, l{an-
sas, Michigan, Mississippi and Washington, in support 
of the premise that the contract of employment is a 
continuing. one, and that the employee's right of action 
accrues and the statute begins to run when and only 
when the services are fully perforn1ed or the en1ploy1nent 
otherwise terminated. 
We feel it unnecessary to answer appellant's con-
tention that appellants were prejudiced through submit-
ting the case to the jury for the entire period, since the 
v~rdict was $200 in excess of the maximum allowance of 
$100 per n1onth during the period not barred hy the 
statute of lin1itations (under their contention), inasmuch 
as there is nothing to indicate but that this verdict was 
rendered on a quantum n1eruit basis during the period 
of time in which they admit the claim was alive. 
POINT IV 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE EVIDENCE OF INSANITY 
AND PRESUMED INSANITY, FOR THE REASON THAT 
THERE WAS NO VALID ADJUDICATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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INSANITY IN EXISTENCE, AND THE SO-CALLED EVI-
DENCE WAS NOT NEWLY DISCOVERED AND THE OB-
JECTION WAS NOT TIMELY MADE . 
..:\ ppellants claiin error because their J\fotion for a 
K ew Trial on the basis, anwng other things, of newly 
discoyered eYidence concerning plaintiff's insanity, was 
denied. Briefly, there is no doubt that the trial judge 
acted well within the discretion permitted him to deny 
such n1otion, if he determined from the evidence pres-
ented hi1n that inforn1ation concerning plaintiff's sanity 
or lack thereof was not ne·wly discovered evidence. 
Among such evidence presented to him for considera-
tion was this: plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit in 
objection to defendants' said ~lotion for New Trial (S-8) 
setting forth that defendants' counsel, during the trial 
of said cause, confronted plaintiff's counsel with in-
formation concerning plaintiff's incarceration in an 
Oregon asylum. The affidavit stated further that de-
fendants under oath at the trial admitted that they knew 
plaintiff had come from Oregon in 1941, and that for 
nine years thereafter had lived with them continuously 
and had taken all his meals with them and had been "one 
of the family." Those facts in said affidavit were never 
controverted by defendants in the presentation of their 
motion, leaving no doubt that the trial judge could 
properly have found that defendants' evidence was not 
newly discovered. 
It appears to the writer that whichever horn of their 
dilemma appellants seek to grasp, their position is not 
improved. If they sought a new trial because the plain-
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tiff might have been presented to the jury as insane and 
incompetent, how could they overcome having lived with 
him intimately nine years and never having a suspicion 
concerning his sanity. On the other horn, if his insanity 
existed and was of such palpable nature as to affect the 
outcome of . their case, then they had a duty to raise the 
objection in timely fashion as required by law. In that 
respect (even if the Utah court were required to give 
full faith and credit to a foreign insanity adjudication 
if such existed at the time of trial), Bancroft on Code 
Pleading at p. 332 states the following: 
"Incapacity of plaintiff to sue is a ground 
of special demurrer. The want of capacity to sue 
which is apparent on the face of con1plaint must 
be taken by demurrer," citing among other cases 
Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Eli,te Candy Co., 
47 Ut. 1, 168 Pac. 427. "If the objection does not 
so appear, it must be taken by answer," (citing 
the Tooele case) "and if it is not raised by either 
1nethod, it is waived" (citing again the Tooele 
case among others). 
In Blumauer v. Clock, Washington, G4 Pac. 8-±-t, 
plaintiff minors in their own names sued to foreclose 
a mechanic's lien. The objection that the minors had 
undertaken to sue in their own names without the inter-
vention of a guardia:q was not raised until after the trial. 
IIeld: "After pleading to the merits, the objection can-
not be raised, for the defendant is deemed to have there-
by admitted that plaintiff is rectus in curia. 14 Enc. Pl. & 
Proc., 1019 and cases cited." 
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In Tooele Llleat v. Eite Candy, supra, judgment hy 
plaintiff was affinned on appeal. Plaintiff in error 
sought to set aside the judgn1ent on the ground of fraud, 
alleging that plaintiff fraudulently alleged in its original 
complaint that it was a corporation of the State of Utah 
when there did not and had not existed any such corpo-
ration. The court said: 
"There is still another reason 'vhy this appeal 
must fail. The objection that the plaintiff has 
not legal capacity to sue, or to maintain or prose-
cute an action is one that, under all of the codes, 
must be taken at the proper time and in the 
proper manner or it will be deemed waived. Such 
an objection is like one that the plaintiff is not 
the real party in interest. That objection must 
be taken by special demurrer if it appears on 
the face of the complaint, and, if it does not so 
appear, then advantage of it must be taken by 
answer, and if not taken either by answer or 
demurrer the objection is waived. The objection 
of want of legal capacity to sue is also waived 
lmless made either by answer or demurrer," citing 
a long list of cases. · 
"A judg1nent, however, in an action in which 
the plaintiff did not have the legal capacity to sue 
or to prosecute the same is not void, and, as we 
have seen, is a matter that may be waived, and, 
under all the authorities, unless the objection is 
made at the proper tin1e and in the proper man-
ner is waived. The plaintiff, not having made the 
objection in the former action, it has waived its 
right to interpose the same in this action * * * 
Again, even though it were conceded that the 
judgment in the former action was obtained 
through a misstatement of the facts respecting 
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the legal capacity to sue, yet that standing alone, 
would not be sufficient cause to set aside the 
judgment in this case. The rule in that regard 
is well and correctly stated in 15 RCL sec. 215, 
pp. 762-764 inc." 
Thus, even if appellants are to say that because of their 
ignorance of the facts upon which they could have raised 
a timely objection, that they should be allowed to raise 
the objection now, their position is untenable under the 
ruling of our Supreme Court above, where the plaintiffs 
in error not only claimed ignorance of the true facts, but 
set forth grounds of actual fraud and misrepresentation 




Also, in San Luis Obispo County v. Simas, 34 ALR 
"It was unsuccessfully urged upon appeal 
from a judgment in eminent domain proceedings 
that the court erred in signing the findings and 
judgment after counsel for the defendant owner 
of the property condemned, had requested time 
within which to make proof of such owner's in-
sanity, the court stating that the cause had heen 
tried and submitted and verdict returned, and the 
rights of the parties were to be determined as 
they existed at the time of such submission." 
Appellants set forth in their brief the varying and 
conflicting authorities as to the effect of a rendition of 
a sanity adjudication in another state. To hold with 
appellants in accordance with the authorities most favor-
able to them-that an Oregon adjudication should be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
giYen full faith and credit-is of no help to them, for 
the reason that there was no binding adjudication in 
Oregon in existence at the tin1e of this trial. The amended 
complaint herein was filed February 10, 1950, and trial 
'vas connnenced ~\pril ~7, 1950. Appellant's affidavit 
of Dr. Donald \Yair, Supt. of the Eastern Oregon State 
Hospital (26) shows that plaintiff escaped frmn said 
institution on August 11, 1941, was absent continually 
thereafter and was discharged fron1 said hospital on 
Feb. 21, 1950, just 11 days after the commencement of 
this suit and more than two months before the trial of 
this cause. Plaintiff was discharged from the institu-
tion and his guardianship immediately thereafter termi-
nated. So there is no merit to appellants' claim that 
Utah must recognize a foreign insanity adjudication, for 
none such existed when plaintiff was produced as a wit-
ness and as a party plaintiff, thus killing appellants' 
contention that plaintiff had no power or capacity to 
commence this action because of Sec. 104-3-6, DCA 1943. 
Furthermore, such statutes requiring that an infant 
or insane or incompetent person who is a party must 
appear by guardian, are held to be procedural only, not 
jurisdictional, and not mandatory in any sense, for the 
reason that such statutes are designed to protect the 
interests of the incompetent, rather than from the stand-
point of capacity to institute :; suit. 
There is a lengthy annotation in 140 ALR at page 
1336, "Mental Incompetency at Time of Rendition of 
Judgment in Civil Action as Ground of Attack on it." 
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Generally, the annotation iterates the accepted rule that 
a judgment rendered against an incompetent who ap-
pears for himself without guardian or next friend, is not 
void but rnerely voidable upon proof of rather stringent 
requirements which must be found in favor of the in-
competent. When such a harsh rule is maintained in 
favor of upholding a judgment against an incompetent 
who appears improperly, how then can the court upset 
a judgment in favor of an incompetent who appeared 
improperly and could only have harmed himself by his 
defects. The accepted rule as laid down in the cited 
annotation is further repeated in a lengthy annotation 
in 34 ALR at page 221. 
As hereinafter stated, the word "must" is not con-
sidered as mandatory, and the annotation in 140 ALR 
1336 recites as follows, quoting from the case of Backley 
National Bank v. Boone, 1940-CCA 4th, 115 F 2d 513: 
"The rule that a judgment against an insane 
person not represented by a guardian or com-
mittee will not be set aside, even upon direct at-
tack, unless a meritorious defense to the action is 
shown, applies even in states where it is provided 
by statute that in a suit against an insane person 
a guardian ad litem for the defendant must be 
appointed, since such requirement is procedural 
and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court." 
The annotation further cites, Home Life Insurance 
v. Cohen, 1936-278 Mich. 169, 270 NW 256: 
"Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for an 
insane defendant under a Statute providing that, 
after service of process, the action shall not be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
further prosecuted until the appoinbnent of such 
a guardian, renders the judg1nent against such 
defendant n1erely voidable, since such statute is 
procedural only." 
\Yhere the plaintiff was Insane and appeared h:'; 
hin1self without guardian or next friend as required hy 
statute to do, just as in the instant case, courts have held 
that the plaintiff was properly before the court and 
have allowed the judgn1ent to stand after the defect was 
pointed out. K o leniency was shown even to such in-
competents who had, by Yirtue of their very incompet-
ency, waived the rights enacted for their benefit. 34 ALR 
at page 22-! declares this result under circumstances 
where the incompetent alone appears as plaintiff, and 
no conflicting authorities are found therein. \Ve cite 
therefrom particularly two cases : 
"In Hubbard v. \Villiams, 14-! Ga. 566, 87 SE 
780, the court dismissed a petition to set aside 
a judgment rendered against an idiot in an action 
instituted by her without a guardian, where it ap-
peared that the action was brought by the idiot 
and two plaintiffs to enjoin a process direqted 
against all of them." 
"In Leonard v. The Times, 51 Ill. App. 427, 
where it appeared that, after the commencement 
of an action, the plaintiff was adjudged to be 
temporarily insane and confined to an asylum at 
the time of the dismissal of the action for want of 
prosecution and, after regaining his liberty, 
moved to set aside the order of dismissal, the 
court held that the fact of his insanity and con-
finement at the time of the dismissal afforded no 
ground for relief." 
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These cases are even more dmnning against appel-
lants than a similar result (which is what we pray for) 
would be to us, since these plaintiffs were unfortunate~y 
incompetent and unprotected from the inception of suit 
right through adjudication of the cases on the merits. 
The decisions aforesaid expressly reject a contention 
much stronger than appellants' contention (that the 
judgment should be set aside, or a new trial granted) 
because of failure merely to commence plaintiff's action 
by guardian. 
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, we feel the 
lower court properly denied defendants' motion on such 
ground. Sec. 104-2-37, UCA 1943, expressly allows an 
incompetent to maintain this action within one year after 
his disability is removed, and certainly appellants were 
not prejudiced in any way by the n1ere preiTlature filing 
of this action when it was brought to fruition within a 
period expressly reserved to plaintiff for this very type 
of action. 
However, since the evidence projected as a basis 
for new trial was not newly discovered and there was no 
Oregon adjudication in existence, and the motion was 
properly denied, it besomes unnecessary for the court 
to pass upon the effect of an adjudication of insanity 
rendered by a sister state, but in passing we cite that the 
better rule would be in line with the authorities holding 
that such an adjudication is not binding and will not 
be recognized at all in other states, and that to establish 
in another state the condition or status detennined there-
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by, there n1nst be nn independent inquisition. The views 
of the yarying dPrisions are set forth in ~S A1n. J ur. Sec. 
23, and the language of this section is cmnpletely anno-
tated in 102 ALR cmn1nenring at p. -l--l--1-. The annotation 
says: 
"Insanity is not a status. If insanity is found 
at the don1irile, it does not affect the condition 
of the person in another state; if he is to be 
treated as insane in the other state, he must there 
be found insane," citing Re Jones, 1935, N.D., 263 
X\Y 160; Cates v. Bingham, -19 Conn. 875; H otch-
kiss v. illiddlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S.E. 36, 43 
L.R.A. 806. 
•' A theory sometimes advanced against the 
conclusive recognition (of such adjudication) is 
that from its very nature it is intended to be not 
permanent or immutable, but subject to change 
both in the state where it is rendered and in other 
states, as in the course of nature changes in the 
mental condition of the person in question may 
warrant or require," citing McNeill v. Harlow, 
81 Fla. 401, 88 So. 127. 
Because there was no valid existing adjudication 
of plaintiff's insanity at the time of his trial, appellant's 
complaint at p. 31 of their brief that plaintiff could not 
be a witness under Sec. 104-49-2 (1), UCA 1943, likewise 
fails. 
Appellant's next argument that if plaintiff was in-
sane, his contracts, including the contract sued upon in 
this case, would have been void, 28 Am. Jur. p. 695, is 
unsound, for even an insane person is entitled to com-
pensation for his labors under quantum meruit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants had a full and fair trial on the m~rits 
of both causes of action pleaded and proved by plain-
tiff, and lost. The jnry awarded plaintiff a verdict 
which amounted to about $60.00 per n1onth plus board 
and room for six years. A motion for new trial was 
heard by the trial judge, and he acted properly within 
the discretion given him in denying it. Thereafter, in 
violation of our statute forbidding the bringing of a 
further similar n1otion before a different judge, defend-
ants moved again for a new trial, but the second judge 
likewise ruled against them. 
For the reasons heretofore set out, we feel that 
there is no merit whatever in any of the contentions of 
error of appellants. They are sham, smoke, and red 
herring. The writer feels that this appeal is somewhat 
akin to the 1last desperate effort of a drowning man to 
clutch a straw-a last ditch stand for a new trial because 
the dead man's lips are'now sealed. 
Respondent respectfully prays that the judgment 
of the lower court be affinned because there is ample 
law and evidence to support one or all of the theories . 
under which the jury founded its verdict, and no pre-
judicial error was committed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARY J. CONDAS, 
ELLIOTT V.l. EVANS, 
A !torneys for ReszJOndent. 
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